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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT:J OF UTAH
S'f.i\'rE ()}1, UTi\ I I, By and 1,hrough
Its l{oad Cotnmission,
l)laintiff and Respondent,
vs.
BE~

DA \'"IS et ux et al,
Defendants and

Case No.
10112
Respondents~

ll(>X.L\LD \\r. L.~1.Y'l.,ON et ux,
Defe·ndant and Appellant.

APPELL~TS'

BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
An action by the Utah State Road Commission
to condemn various property interests in Irving Park
Addition, Salt Lake County.

DISPOSITIOX IN LOWER COURT
The trial court disregarded directives in Utah Code
and entered judgment for respondents concerning lot
3
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19 Block 7, Irving Park Addition. Trial court denied

motion for new trial.
RELIEF SOUGH'!" ON APPEAL
Appellants seek an order reversing lower court's
judgment and an order directing the lower court to set
compensation for the property interest owned by appellants and taken by plaintiff as set forth in the demand
for judgment of plaintiff's complaint.
STATEMEN'I, OF FACTS
Following the year 1956 appellants purchased
various lots in Irving Park Addition. In the acquisition
of these lots appellant had occasion to discuss the
method of acquiring land, on which there was delinquent taxes, with an attorney who represented to appant that he had offices at 141 East 2nd South and a
client who was also interested in such acquisitions.!
In the spring of 1958, appellant, in examining
the records in the County Recorder's office pertaining
to said subdivision, found that respondent Mr. Davis
had succeeded in acquiring deeds to lot 19 Block 7,
Irving Park Addition. As the lot in question stood in
the name of James L. Turner and appellants were
also looking for this man or his heirs to clear title to
additional land in another area which appellants were
1. Return address from body of Davis' and Neilson's deeds,. shown

in title report contained in record, is same address where appellants had discussion.
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inten·stt·d in, appellants began checking to see if the
grantor ,J :unes Blair 'furner \Vas connected. Upon the
firuling- that .James L. 'furner \vas deceased and had
oue son, James Blair Turner, and one daughter, ~Iae
Elaine 'furner, appellant was convinced that these
"'t•re the proper people to conYey the title that had
descended to them from their father, James L. Turner.
Upon approaching Mr. '_rurner, appellant discovered that he kne\\· ~Ir. Turner personally, though
not by n:une. 'Vhen in the course of the conversation
concerning the signing of the deed to Mr. Davis, the
appellant asked ~Ir. Turner why his wife had not
joined in signing the deed to Mr. Davis. Mr. Turner
replied that the gentleman offered no extra compensation for her signature as he thought she had no claim,
therefore she did not join with him in signing the deed.
A\ppellant, ha,·ing bought and sold two or three parcels
of land knew a 'vife's signature was necessary and
questioned )lr. Turner further. Mr. Turner said that
if nppellant would like to buy his wife's interest, he
C~Ir. Turner) would give the appellant the abstract
to the lot his father had left them also. As evidenced
by the title report, this offer was accepted by appellant
and ~Ir. 'rurner and his "·ife signed the deed as shown
by the record. I
4-\ppellants recorded the deed from the Turners
concerning this lot Jan. 8, 1960, and shortly thereafter had occasion to inform ~Ir. Clarence Williams
1. No. 7 page 3 of Title Report.
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of the Right of Way Department of the Utah State
Road Commission of the interest they claimed.
As negotiations between the parties broke down,
plaintiff filed this action and served appellants on April
4, 1963. Appellants read contents of complaint and
res.pondent's answer filed April 23, 1963 and declined
to file answer since they were satisfied at that time that
their interests were recognized although not in full
compliance with the law. 1 Respondents in their answer
(paragraph I) admitted appellants had some interest
in the parcel in question.as set forth in paragraphs No.
6 and 7 of plaintiff's complaint. On or about July 29,
1963 plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Service was
made on appellants on July 31, 1963. This, appellants
read, agreed with, then checked respondent's answer
to amended_complaint which admitted appellants' claim
again in paragraph No. 2. Appellants still being satisfied, again declined to file an answer. 2
Hearing nothing more, appellants had no knowledge of Trial Court's actions until Dec. 10·, 1963 when
appellants again checked the record and much to their
surprise, now found that their claim as pertains to lot
19 block 7, Irving Park Addition, had been the subject
of discussion at pretrial on Nov. 4, 1963 where it had
been the ruling of the pretrial court that appellants
could be barred. Trial was set for Dec. 18, 1963, but
judgment was entered Dec. 11, 1963.
1. 78-34-9 Directs Court in granting orders of immediate occu-

pancy.
2. Rule 54 (c) (2) Limits of default judgments.

6
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l Tpon reading the foll<nving statements:
·· i\ t the titne of the pretrial, it was the ruling

of the !)retrial l~ourt that if the Davises would
t'stahlish their chain of title at the time of the
trial. that would be all that would be necessary to
bar I..~aytons from making any claim in this act ion and Ln vtons are in default in this action
and .their <lef:~ult is entered. Title may be proven
in the Da vises by a certified title report from a
duly licensed title company." (From page 3 of
pretrial order)
and

"'I'he fee simple title to lot 19 block 7 was in
1\. P. Neilson, but subject to encumbrances
sho\\·n in Schedule B." (From page I of Title
Report).
nppellants decided that in order to preserve their rights
in the n1a.tter, they had best enter an appearance. Therefore on Dec. 17, 1963 appellants filed a motion to set
aside j udg1nent as pertains to lot 19 block 7, Irving
Park ..:\ddition. and also an answer to plaintiff's complaint. This motion stated the grounds for appellants'
clain1 to said lot. A hearing was held and the motion
was granted . .L~ trial "Tas set for Jan. 29, 1964. At this
trial appellants found respondents again denying the
validity of appellants' claim to said lot CONTRARY
TO THE AD:\IISSIONS MADE. IN RESPONDEX1.,S ..:\XS'\TER. 1 As soon as the appellants adnutted there had been four years elapse between date
1. Nothing was indicated in answer that respondents claimed
under a tax title or that their claim was adverse to appellant's
claim.
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of redemption when taxes were paid by respondents!
and the date this action was filed, the Court said appellants were barred 2 from ·making any further showing
as to the validity of their claim. From this adverse and
ultra vires holding, appellants made a motion for new
trial or an amendment to proceedings) From a denial
of this motion Feb. 27, 1964 and from the adverse judgment, appellant appeals.·

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
Appellants were denied the options afforded by the
law as the rules pertaining to default judgments and
good pleadings were ignored. The Court committed
ultra vires acts in adjudicating title when that question
was not before the Court.
1. The plaintiff and/or the Court erred in not following the directives as outlined in the following sections and Rules of Civil Procedure of Utah Code An- .
notated 1953 as revised ..
a. Section 1. to 14th Amendment to Constitution
of the United States.
" ... no state shall m·ake or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges of citizens
... ; nor deny to any person 'vithin its juris1. Orie who is under a duty to pay taxes cannot add to or strength·
en his title by purchasing the land at a tax sale. Hadlock v.
Benjamin Drainage District 89 P 94, 53 P2d 1157.
2. Contrary to Art. I, Sect. 11 Constitution of Utah.
3. See Motion for New Trial filed Feb. 7, 1964.

8
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diction. the equal protection of the la,vs.
(..t\gainst -t-year statute).
h. Section :! • ..L\rticle 1, l onstitution of Utah.
". \ ll political power is inherent in the people
nnd all free governtnents are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and benefit ... " (Against 4-year statute).
1

c. Section 11, Article 1, Constitution of Utah.
1\11 courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his ... property,
shall have remedy by due course of law ...
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal ... , by
himself, any civil cause to which he is a party."
(Against 4-year statute).
H

d. Section 27, Article I, Constitution of Utah.
"Frequent recourse to fundamental principles
is essential to the security of individual rights
"
e. Section 7 4-4-3, Utah Code Annotated.
Defines wife's interest in husband's property.
(Also in statement of facts and motion Dec.
17, 1963}.
f. Section 76-20-10.
Husband conveying as unmarried man. Protection given dower as dower has always been
favorite in the law. 1 Davis and Neilson took
all the proceeds as in judgment Dec. 11, 1963,
and never told of outstanding dower interest.
''Then confronted by appellants, they changed
story and resorted to ambiguous law for protection. ( 4-year statute).
1. In Re. Madsen's Estate 123 U 329 point number 9.
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g. Section 78-34-9.
Pertains to method of procuring order of immediate occupancy. Bond is necessary to protect condemnee. Had the Court required compliance with this procedure, respondents
would not have had opportunity to claim appellant's share nor invoke ambiguous statute.
h. Section 78-34-10 ( 1) .
Compensation. How assessed. (Each interest
must be ascertained) .
i. Section 59-10-45.
One who is under a duty to pay taxes cannot
add to or strengthen his title by purchasing
· the·land at a tax sale. (Hadlock v. Benjamin
Drainage District 53 P2d 1157}.

j. Section 59-5-12.
Taxes must be assessed in name of owner if
known. Appellants recorded deed properly so
interest claimed by them was known to all.
Apparently there are no taxes to be assessed
against dower right and it is to be treated as
life tenant and remainderman.
· It is duty of assessor to assess all property
at its value, and it is likewise duty of every
person and corporation having taxable property to list same for taxation. (Ut. ld. Sugar
Co. v. S. L. County 60 U 491, 210 P 106, 27
ALR 874}.
A life tenant should be assessed as owner during the continuance of life estate. ( Sheppick
v. Sheppick 44 U 131,138 U 1169}.
k. Section 78-39-1.
If property held by cotenants, can have partition.
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I. Section 78-39-2.
Cotnplaint must set forth interest of all partit·s specifieally anrl particularly if known to
plaiutiff. (Statement of facts).
111.

Set' t ion 78-39-3.
Parties tnust be named if of record and as record shows. (Title report) .

n. Section 78-39-30.

l>rotection <)f contingent future rights. (Court
n1ust protect) .
o. Section 59-5-14.
1\.ssessment of property of decedents. "
and the payment of taxes made by either binds
all the parties in interest for their proportions." r\.s a matter of equity, the party entitled to present possession should also pay all
the taxes during the time his right to possession is unimpaired. ( Sheppick v. Sheppick
44 U 1311 138 P 1169). (Madsen's Estate
123

u 327).

p. Rule 7 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Limits question before the Court to that which
is asked for in demand for judgment. (Toone
Y. Oneil Const. Co. 40 U 265, 277, 121 P 10).
q. Rule 52 (a)~
·· ... find the facts specially ... " (There was
never a finding as to value of appellant's interest}. The trial Court should not make findings of fact "?here there is no evidence to support them. If it does so, judgment will be reYersed. (Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines
Co. 42 U 520, 132 P 388, 390).
(Title report showing Neilson's title also
sho,ved it encumbered by Layton's deed).

11
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It is the duty of the trial Court to find upon
all material issues raised by the pleadings,
and failure to do so is reversible error (Baker
v. Hatch 70 U I, 257 P 673).
Until the Court has found on all the material
issues raised by the pleadings, the findings are
insufficient to support a judgment. {Prows
v. Hawley 72 U 444, 450, 271 P 31).
r. Rule 52 (b) .
Motion to amend may be made. Appellants
tried to tell the Court that it had erred in motion filed Feb. 7, 1964. Court said appellants
were barred by section 78-12-12.1.
s. Rule 54 (c) ( 2) .
Pertains to default judgments. After disobeying this directive, does Court have jurisdiction
over appellants who have been forced into
Court to set the record straight?
t. Rule 61 Error.
In action for damages to coat left with defendant for cleaning and repairing, instruction charging that if coat was unfit for use,
jury should find for plaintiff, and also find
that defendant be permitted to retain coat Wa8
not proper subject for disposition~ but such
error was beneficial, rather than prejudicial,
to defendant. (Garff v. Myers Cleaning &
Dyeing Co. 65 U 548, 238 P. 278) .
Causes are not reversed for mere error. They
are reversed for prejudicial error. Therefore
to entitle appellant to pevail, he must show
both error and prejudice. (Boyd v. San Pedro,
L.A. & S.L. R. R. Co. 45 U 449, 146 P. 282).
While burden is on appellant, not only to show
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error. but also prejudice offsetting some substaulinl right, yet if he shows this, then the
burden. or rather duty of going forward is
east upon respondent to show by the record
that conunitted error \vas not or could not
have been of harmful effect. (Jensen v. Utah
l{.lt. Co 7:! U 366, 270 P 359).
()ne who induces the Court to charge something not the la,v, will not be heard thereafter
to conlpl,in. (Hunter v. Wm. M. Roylance
C'o . .t5 U 135, 143 P. 140).
p. Rule 15 (b)

\\rhen issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
they had been raised in the pleadings. (Issues
consented to, limited by appellants motion of
Dec. 17, 1963).
l'losely related to this .rule is the well-settled
doctrine that a litigant cannot come into court
upon one theory and recover on another. (Free
'y· Little 31 U 449, 88 P 407) .
. . \ ppellants call attention at this point to the reason
for vacating the default judgment. 1 Respondents will
undoubtedly contend that by the order vacating Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of
Dec. 11, 1963, appellants gave permission to enlarge
the question before the Court to one of quiet title. Were
that the case, appellants would not be before the Court
no\\· on appeal. Appellants have objected all the way.
(lluehner Block Co. v-. Glezon 6 U2d 226, 410 P2d
517).
1. Motion filed Dec. 17, 1963 stating appellant's claims.

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
The Court was prevented from hearing appellant's
full story by the use of Section 78-12-5.1, ...
Appellants were denied the equal protection of the
law as there is no provision for the protection of holders
of contingent or future rights in the four year short
statutes.
Holders of such legal rights, by the very nature
of such rights, are denied the present possession to such
property. Therefore holding such a law to be valid in
this case is contrary to constitutional restraints. I
78-12-5.1 " . . . with respect to actions brought or

interposed . . . or determine the ownership of real
property against the holder of a tax title to such property, no such action or defense shall be commenced or
interposed more than four years after the date of the
tax deed, conveyance ... unless the person commencing
or interposing such action or defense has actually occupied or been in possession within four years prior to
commencement or interposition of such action or defense."
As to the phrase uHas actually occupied" from
Section 78-12-5.1, the appellants are in confusion as
to exactly what its meaning is. Just how does one go
about occupying vacant property-much less when one
does not have the right to possession at present? Appellants, in the course of filling their adjacent lots with
1. Section 1, 14th Amendment-Equal protection of law.
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till dirt and leveling same. have on numerous occasions
bet.'n upon the lot in question. Does this fulfill the
stu tutory requirement 1 Respondents did not fence, fill,
grade. plo'r or in nny other manner change the character
of the lot in question nor in any manner show an adverse
claim to appellants.

By its terms. this statute, contrary to most such
statutes bars actions or defenses brought to overturn a
tax title. 1 Construed as it was in this action its use
hecnn1e not one of compliance by respondent of statutory requirements to perfect their title, but as a bar2
to prevent appellants from pointing out where the
Court strayed from its jurisdiction and facts that would
prevent its use in the first place.
A holding to the words in this statute does not
allo"· protection for contingent interests such as appellant's claim.3 As has been pointed out in Madsen's
Estate (123 U. 327), "The right of dower does not
affect the sesien of the husband's grantee." Therefore
as appellants have no right to present possession, how ·
can the fact that appellants were not in possession be
held. against them.4 Had appellants brought an action
\\·ithin four years, nothing would have been accomplished and the parties would be exactly where they
1. To defeat a claim by the bar of the statutes of limitation is
~ot a determination of a case u,pon its merits. (Goeltz v. Continental B & L Co. 5 U2d 204, 299 P2d 832).
2. ~ticle I Section 11 Constitution of Utah.
. . . and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party."
3. Tor~nto v. Sheffield et al 222 P2d 594 point 2.
4. Article 1, Section 2, Constitution of Utah.
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were the date this action was filed. That is, appellants
knew of the manner respondents cleared the taxes and
what claim they had, and respondents knew of appellants' claims.
As a matter of equity, which, by Section 68-3-2
Utah Code Annotated, must prevail over statutory enactments, this short statute is the height of absurdity.
It enables one who is in possession of the real property
in question to reap the benefits that are distributed
freely to inhabitants of the taxing district while harshly
holding against an owner of vacant property that is
taxed to provide the benefits needed by the party in
possession. Why should the legislature penalize the
person who gets no benefits and protect the one who
rides for free?
This statute is not equal in its protection in that
if a person buys a vacant piece of real estate under a
tax title rather than one that is occupied by the
owner, he merely has to pay the taxes for four years
then presto, the land is practically his. If he does the
same with one that is occupied, then what? Has the
law given equal protection to the tax title buyer? He
might even have to resort to litigation to recover his
money while the other buyer is protected after a statutory time lapse. Does he get the property? Not according to these sections, nor does it in any way shed light
upon the method of achieving equality. A statute which
bars actions, after four years, for the recovery of real
property sold by the County for the non-payment of
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delinquent taxes, but \vhich does not bar an action for
the recovery of real property when the former owner
is in possession or actually occupies the property, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unconstitutional since the
differentiation between the two buyers bears no reasonable relation to the purpose to be accomplished by
the statute and is discriminatory to buyers who purchase
tnx titles "'here the land is occupied or possessed by
the tax debtor .1

CONCLUSION
.t\ppell~nts

contend that due to an unconstitutional
law (four year short statute), an attempt was made
to deprive them of a property right in violation of
Section I, _14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and in variation to law as set forth in the statutes
and in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

.

As is shown by the record and directed by law,
appellants should have had their rights presented to
the Court by counsel for the plaintiff, together with
a fair appraisal of its worth before title could be divested from them.2

''Then individuals are claimants of the same lot
as disclosed by the title report contained in the record
1. Tor~nto v. Sheffield P 594 P2d point No. 3.
2. Article 1. Section 7 Utah State Constitution. "No person to
be ~eprived of property without due process of law."
Article I, Section 22, Utah State Constitution. "Private property not to be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."
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of this action, the presumption should be that each
knows the facts and the law surrounding the acquisition
and disposition of their respective shares.
In the light of these facts, admissions in respondent's answer, and directives given by statute, appellants,
therefore, pray for an order reversing the lower Court's
judgment and directing that Court to set compensation
to be paid appellants in order to extinguish their claim
and for their costs and any other further relief this
Court sees fit to direct.
After reading Toronto v. Sheffield, Crystal Lime
and Cement Co. v. Robbins, 1 and other cases pertinent
to tax titles, it reminds one of the eminent English
chemist who was seeking the universal solvent until
one day the village nit wit confronted him with the
question, "What are you going to keep it in?"
Respectfully submitted,

DONALD W. LAYTON
For Self

1. Crystal Lime and Cement Co. v. Robbins 116 U 314, 209 P2d

~~Yef

on petition for rehearing, Volume 594 No. 7134.
Toronto v. Sheffield 222 P2d 594, Brief in Volume 594 No.
7233, pages 3 7 and 38.
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